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T here is a quiet revolution underway inU.S. nuclear strategy. It is overshad-owed by the global war on terrorism,questions over homeland security, and
chaos in the international order. It is revolution-
ary because it reflects many changes in threats,
capabilities, and doctrine that have preoccupied
nuclear planners since the 1950s. It also high-
lights the way the Armed Forces prepare for fu-
ture conflicts.
A revolution disturbs supporters as well as
critics of the status quo. The vision found in the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is part of a wider
endeavor to develop new policies.1 It embraces
the concepts of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence,
defense, and denial articulated in the Quadren-
nial Defense Review in 2001. Both reviews set pri-
orities for formulating defense and foreign policy,
developing a strategic relationship with Russia,
and countering the proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical (NBC) weapons and long-
range ballistic missiles.
New Threats, New Opportunities
Nuclear policy reflects strategic, political,
and technological trends that emerged over the
last decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union pre-
sented an opportunity to foster a new strategic re-
lationship. The United States concluded that mas-
sive nuclear arsenals, which had produced the
concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD),
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arms control agreements, and many views of the
Cold War, were no longer relevant. Moreover,
both countries would benefit by reducing defense
budgets. During the 2000 presidential campaign,
supporters of George Bush noted that the arms
control regime prevented adjustments to meet fis-
cal realities and new threats. Arms control was
the source of acrimony; the time had come to
stop regarding Russia as an enemy and to develop
a more cooperative approach to managing strate-
gic relations.
Though many observers marveled at the
effectiveness of precision-guided air strikes in the
Persian Gulf War, advances in technology did not
stop. The information revolution of the 1990s
continued to transform military capabilities.
Sometimes called the revolution
in military affairs, it involves in-
tegrating surveillance and recon-
naissance sensors, information
processing, tactical and opera-
tional communications, and pre-
cision-guided munitions. Today,
commanders can use data from
myriad sensors—generically known as the global
command and control system—to acquire a pic-
ture of the battlespace in real time, a capability
did not exist ten years ago. The Pentagon wants
to use advances in command, control, communi-
cations, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to inte-
grate nuclear and conventional forces so they can
be responsive on short notice.
Concern has grown over the prolifera-
tion of NBC weapons and related delivery sys-
tems. The conflict between Iran and Iraq and the
Gulf War highlighted the danger posed by long-
range missiles and hinted at this new threat. A
national intelligence estimate issued in 1995,
Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the
Next Fifteen Years, posed relatively benign threats.
It was discredited by the Rumsfeld Commission
Report and the North Korean test of the Taepo-
Dong missile in 1998. The sarin attack in the
Tokyo subway in 1995, Indian and Pakistani tests
of nuclear weapons in 1998, the end of U.N. in-
spections in Iraq, and the terrorist attacks on 9/11
have turned weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
into a salient threat. In a report to Congress, the
Central Intelligence Agency identified nine states
that were developing or seeking to acquire such
weapons. According to the Nuclear Policy Review,
Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria could be
involved in a nuclear contingency.2 Various non-
state actors and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda,
which are reportedly seeking NBC and radiologi-
cal weapons, also are depicted as posing a serious
threat to the United States.
Recent trends present a challenge. On
one hand, there is a strategic capability optimized
for a threat that no longer exists and that is con-
sidered the stumbling block in Russian-American
relations. On the other, failures in nonprolifera-
tion confront planners with relatively small-scale
threats that could become serious problems with
little warning. Although the Armed Forces may
confront an enemy willing to use NBC weapons,
the revolution in military affairs provides ways of
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employing conventional weapons for missions
once reserved for nuclear forces.
The End of MAD
The Nuclear Posture Review and the
Quadrennial Defense Review indicate that mutual
assured destruction (MAD) is not an acceptable
basis for a strategic relationship. According to the
former review, the United States “will no longer
plan, size, or sustain its forces as though Russia
presented merely a smaller version of the threat
posed by the Soviet Union.” In other words, be-
cause Russian nuclear arms are seen as a waning
threat, deterrence will no longer dominate nu-
clear doctrine and targeting.
Although the current administration has
not articulated a clear plan to transform strategic
relations, policy changes are creating a new bilat-
eral framework. Washington took the initiative
by announcing a shift in nuclear doctrine, negoti-
ating strategic force reductions, and introducing
confidence-building measures that were intended
to reduce tension and foster relations. Viewed in
this light, withdrawing from the Antiballistic Mis-
sile Treaty becomes a positive step because it de-
livered a lethal shock to an outdated strategic
framework. As the United States has repeatedly
noted, the treaty stood in the way of missile de-
fense as well as more cooperative relations with
Moscow. The agreement signed by Presidents
George Bush and Vladimir Putin in May 2002 is
part of this new framework. Though the treaty
limits deployed nuclear warheads to a maximum
of 2,200 by 2012, it is more of a political docu-
ment than a vehicle for arms control and strate-
gic stability. The treaty reflects changes in force
structure discussed in the Nuclear Policy Review
and fulfilled Russian requirements for concrete
evidence of this new partnership.
In fact, bilateralism was helped by prag-
matism. By declaring peace, Bush and Putin have
undermined the strategic rationale for sustaining
the military, institutional, and diplomatic status
quo. The United States made it difficult for Russia
to assume a Cold-War approach because it is will-
ing to reciprocate. Putin found it possible to live
with a limited ABM system in return for reducing
the U.S. nuclear arsenal to Russian levels, which
are based not on doctrine but on a weak econ-
omy. The American approach challenges tradi-
tional arms control and disarmament policies.
Many treaties may become obsolete as bilateral
relations improve. Cooperative efforts to foster
peace, reduce forces, and safeguard materials do
not pose danger to other nations and do not need
to be codified by treaties to reassure world order.
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The New Triad
The Nuclear Policy Review offers a pathway
toward a new strategic triad that is aided by en-
hanced command and control and intelligence
systems with offensive strike systems (nuclear and
non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a
revitalized infrastructure. It assumed that nuclear
weapons are only one of the
capabilities that can address
threats from the prolifera-
tion of NBC weapons and
ballistic missiles. This triad
represents a departure in
strategic doctrine, with de-
terrence, defense, and coun-
terforce acknowledged as components. It can be
best supported by a new force structure, although
the concepts and planning for this advance re-
main undefined.
The new triad is intended to integrate ca-
pabilities (like missile defense), nuclear weapons,
and non-nuclear strike forces into a seamless web
to dissuade potential enemies from mounting
military challenges against the United States, de-
terring enemies, and fighting and winning wars
when deterrence fails. The Nuclear Policy Review
notes that strike elements:
. . . can provide greater flexibility in the design and
conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents de-
cisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be partic-
ularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict
escalation. NPR emphasizes technology as a substi-
tute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn from serv-
ice. Global real-time command and control and recon-
naissance capabilities will take on greater importance
in the new strategic triad. Nuclear weapons could be
employed against targets able to withstand non-nu-
clear attack (for example, deep underground bunkers
or bio-weapons facilities).
Advanced command, control, and intelli-
gence will integrate the triad, facilitating flexible
operations. The new strategic triad will rely on
adaptive planning to meet emerging threats and
contingencies. Emphasis on adaptive planning
differs from the traditional way of developing the
nuclear war plan—the single-integrated opera-
tions plan—which was a deliberate process that
had often taken months or even years to generate
a finite number of options for consideration by
the President as Commander in Chief.
Administration officials suggest that the
new triad would allow reductions in operational
nuclear forces from current START I levels of ap-
proximately 6,000 warheads for each country. The
Treaty of Moscow in May 2002 made a reality of
these levels when the signatories agreed to reduce
strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by
2012. Reductions in the U.S. arsenal will result
from retiring MX Peacekeeper ICBMs (which
began in 2002), removing four Trident submarines
from strategic duty, and eliminating the require-
ment that B–1 bombers have nuclear capabilities.
The administration will maintain a response force
(sometimes known as a reserve force) of warheads
that could be brought back into service. Planners
probably have not finalized the size of this force,
but in all likelihood it will number in the thou-
sands. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations
have maintained that it only makes sense to
count warheads that either are deployed or can be
available for use in days. By contrast, the response
force would only become available after an ex-
tended regeneration and redeployment, which
could take months or years.
The reduction in warheads will be accompa-
nied by the development of new capabilities. The
centerpiece will be missile defense, a multi-
layered protection against accidental launches or
relatively limited strikes. No longer constrained
by treaty, the United States is building on work
initiated nearly a decade ago. The current pro-
gram includes boost-phase interceptors that at-
tack ballistic missiles over enemy territory. There
is special interest in the airborne laser, a speed-of-
light directed energy weapon, and research on
sea, air, and space-based boost phase systems to
defeat missiles in the highly visible and vulnera-
ble initial stage of flight. The plan enhances the
mid-course, ground-based interceptor program
with an expanded testbed. Additional support for
the advanced Patriot missile will bolster terminal
and point defense. This system is intended to
protect land forces against cruise and tactical bal-
listic missile attack. The Pentagon also appears in-
terested in a mobile tactical high-energy laser,
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which will provide ground forces with a directed
energy weapon to counter rockets, cruise missiles,
and artillery and mortar munitions.
The new triad highlights profound changes
in strategic doctrine. First, it makes clear that de-
terring an all-out nuclear war with Russia is no
longer a feature of war plans. Policymakers be-
lieve that to be an extremely remote possibility,
and the nuclear policy and strategy reflect that
perception. Second, the new triad also embodies
an effort to increase the credibility of strategic de-
terrent threats by increasing available options.
The old triad was intended to pose a massive re-
sponse to nuclear attack, while the newly recon-
figured triad guarantees an appropriate way to re-
spond to other forms of aggression, thereby
bolstering deterrence. Third, the new triad con-
cept sidesteps bureaucratic resistance to reconfig-
uring longstanding nuclear doctrine—the sanctity
of the old triad and focus on assuring a massive
response under any circumstances. This strategic
triad paves the way for further reductions in
American strategic nuclear forces.
Proliferation, Counterforce, and War 
Although there is little doubt that the
United States wants to eliminate nuclear deter-
rence as the basis for a strategic relationship with
Russia, it is clear that the Nuclear Policy Review is
not a blueprint for disarmament. But reducing
operational warheads, deploying missile defenses,
shifting to adaptive nuclear planning, and devel-
oping conventional precision-strike capabilities
suggest a new era in strategic thinking and the re-
lationship among nuclear weapons, deterrence,
and nuclear war. The review identifies new target-
ing priorities for nuclear weapons: hardened facil-
ities for command centers, underground facilities
associated with NBC weapons, and mobile tar-
gets, such as NBC-armed missiles. The review
identifes some 1,400 underground sites around
the world that require targeting because conven-
tional weapons cannot destroy them. Thus there
is a need to develop an earth-penetrating capabil-
ity to place these targets at risk.
The Nuclear Policy Review calls for
greater yield flexibility for both stockpiled
weapons and warheads that reduce collateral
damage. By identifying new targets and missions
for nuclear weapons, it would appear that the
United States must design and build arms—a
process that was made difficult by the morato-
rium on testing. Given the unlikelihood that the
moratorium would be abandoned under present
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circumstances, the challenge of overcoming this
basic inconsistency in the policies and capabili-
ties advocated by the review is unclear.
Precision-guided weapons are clearly the
preferred option for preemptive attacks against
WMD infrastructure and delivery systems. Al-
though it is difficult to justify employing nuclear
weapons in order to prevent their use by an
enemy, the arsenal provides escalation domi-
nance. U.S. nuclear superiority makes doing
nothing and being disarmed by a conventional
counterforce attack the only rational response
available to an enemy.
A range of nuclear options makes it more
likely that an enemy with a small WMD arsenal
will lose rather than employ NBC capabilities.
And using such weapons might
generate a nuclear response by
the United States, a perception
that reduces incentives for ini-
tial escalation. Theater and na-
tional missile defenses backstop
conventional counterforce at-
tacks by destroying incoming
warheads. This is a form of nuclear warfighting
and troublingly not hypothetical. It has played
out repeatedly in the case of Iraq, though many
observers fail to pay attention to preventive war
in counterproliferation strategy.
The message for both state and nonstate
actors seeking WMD is unambiguous—America
accepts that it cannot prevent proliferation. In-
stead, it is preparing to target nuclear, biological,
and chemical arsenals with conventional and, if
necessary, nuclear forces. Preemptive attack has
not been ruled out. The President announced at
West Point in June 2002 that U.S. security “will
require all Americans to be forward-looking and
resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend
our lives.”3
Warfighting Issues
While the Nuclear Policy Review makes in-
teresting reading, its implementation falls on the
warfighter. Because of internal inconsistencies,
some challenges may take years to resolve. For ex-
ample, there is a mismatch between force struc-
ture and the new missions given to nuclear
weapons. The review proposes that the weapons
be used to hold hardened underground bunkers
with WMD or command and control facilities at
risk. Yet there are no nuclear weapons in the arse-
nal that are optimized to meet this requirement,
although there are plans to modify the B–61 grav-
ity bomb for earth penetration. And if enemies
simply decide to dig deeper, the length of time
that modified B–61s can hold this target set at
risk is uncertain. The force structure must be
overhauled to meet new targeting needs. This
change will require a review of nuclear programs,
retirement of old systems, and fielding new
weapons.
Conversely, while the Nuclear Policy Review
proposed greater reliance on conventional
weapons to perform strategic missions, the process
of operationalizing this concept is ill defined. In-
creased reliance on conventional munitions as a
substitute for nuclear weapons requires a new tar-
geting methodology, which will require criteria for
targeting. Doctrine must be developed for substi-
tuting conventional weapons to strike targets once
covered by nuclear weapons. Moreover, varied
conventional munitions must be designed, built,
and integrated into the force structure.
Another targeting issue flows from the
reduction in nuclear force levels. Fewer warheads
translate into a reduced number of targets that
can be struck by nuclear weapons. Redundancy in
coverage has played an important role in counter-
force strategy. But making serious reductions in
arsenals could force the United States to confront
nuclear scarcity: by definition counterforce could
become primarily a mission for conventional
weapons, while nuclear weapons are held in re-
serve for countervalue missions. The new threat
environment, however, suggests that nuclear
weapons might be more in demand, not less—to
hold hardened underground facilities at risk.
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Conventional counterforce, under such circum-
stances, could be extremely demanding in terms
of force structure, doctrine, and operations.
Although assigning forces to particular
targets is challenging, there is a broader mis-
match between the nuclear force structure and
the international environment. What are the
benefits of the D–5 SLBM or Minuteman III
against al Qaeda or other transnational/terrorist
threats? Would the United States contemplate
using the Minuteman III against WMD sites? This
imbalance in explosive yield and targets to hold
at risk is a major challenge that takes on greater
urgency given emerging doctrine, which empha-
sizes either preemptive strikes or war to check
such threats. But developing a new generation of
nuclear weapons to match this threat will be diffi-
cult as long as the United States honors a morato-
rium on testing.
There is also a mismatch between calls
for a new generation of nuclear weapons and the
ability of the nuclear infrastructure to meet that
requirement. While the Nuclear Policy Review
draws attention to the deterioration of the infra-
structure, scientists who designed the weapons
are leaving the scene. The source of a new gener-
ation of scientists to design weapons to respond
to future threats is unclear. And even if scientists
are found, it is uncertain how they will design
and construct weapons without resuming nu-
clear tests.
Another major issue facing nuclear plan-
ners is the integration of offensive and defensive
components of the strategic deterrent. The Penta-
gon is entering uncharted waters, and planners
will have to establish a command and control in-
frastructure for the components of the new triad
and determine mechanisms for these command
relationships.
The Nuclear Policy Review represents a
departure in thinking about deterrence. First, it
abandons mutual assured destruction as the basis
of the Russian-American strategic relationship
and eliminates Russia as the benchmark for sizing
nuclear forces. Second, it seeks to substitute con-
ventional for nuclear capabilities as a strategic de-
terrent; the objective in the past was finding ways
to combine conventional and nuclear force struc-
tures to function in a mutually supportive way to
bolster conventional and nuclear deterrence.
Third, the integration of offense and defense to
bolster deterrence by denial is a departure, even if
mechanisms and organizations to integrate these
forces are still on the drawing board.
Despite the critics, the paradox of the
Nuclear Policy Review is that while it appears to
make nuclear use more likely, it reflects the prac-
tice of non-use that emerged after World War II.
Factors other than efficiency or military utility
shape policy on weak states with NBC weapons.
The United States could have addressed prolifera-
tion and long-range delivery systems as a simple
threat. It could have stated that any use of WMD,
conventional strike, or unconventional attack
would be met by a massive use of nuclear
weapons. Instead, planners are searching for op-
tions to deter and defeat WMD-armed enemies
with far less force than an all-out nuclear attack.
The problems of implementing the Nu-
clear Policy Review and operationalizing concepts
in that document will eventually reach warfight-
ers. This is a sobering challenge that will require
decades to meet. But by destroying the paradigm
that informed nuclear strategy in the Cold War,
the review provides an opportunity to develop
nuclear strategy for the 21st century. JFQ
N O T E S
1 Excerpts from the classified version of the report
were reported in The New York Times and The Los Angeles
Times. Most of the text is now posted on the globalsecu-
rity.org website at http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/policy/dod/npr.htm. This cite is taken from the
executive summary released by the Department of De-
fense. Other quotes come from the global security web-
site, although the authors have no way of confirming
its authenticity.
2 ______, Nuclear Policy Review (Washington: _____),
p. 16. By contrast, the document does not characterize
Russia as an immediate or potential concern.
3 ____________ (Washington: ___). For the address go
to http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
06/20020601-3.html.
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Briefing the press on Nuclear Posture Review.
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U.S. Marine Corps (I.M. Gilbert)
M93A1 NBC reconnaissance system.
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Reducing nuclear arsenals in Moscow.
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North Korean nuclear fuel rods, Yongbyon.
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DOD (Jose Lopez, Jr.)
Destroying Pershing II missiles in 1989.
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AP/ Wide World Photo (Efrem Lukatsky)
Cutting nose off Tu-160 missile in Ukraine.
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305th Communication Squadron (Scott H. Spitzer)
Unloading nuclear weapon from C–141B.
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U.S. Air Force (Amanda M. Edwards)
Launching unarmed ICBM, Vandenberg Air Force Base.
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